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COMMENTS
TRAVEL EXPENSES OF A BUSINESSMAN'S WIFE: WIFELY FUNCTIONS AS
A BUSINESS EXPENSE
United States v. Disney, __ F.2d __ (9th Cir. 1969)
Plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Roy Disney, excluded from their joint
return amounts received from his employer, Walt Disney Productions,
as reimbursement for her travel expenses. As president, chairman of the
board and member of the corporation's executive committee, Mr.
Disney traveled extensively as a good-will ambassador. In accordance
with the company's policy which "virtually insisted on the wive's [sic]
presence on trips taken by executives where it is believed their presence
would enhance the company's 'image', or would otherwise promote its
interest,"' Mrs. Disney accompanied her husband on four trips, three
of which were abroad, in 1962 and 1963. The Tax Commissioner
disallowed the claimed exemption, asserting that for Mrs. Disney the
trips were for pleasure rather than business. In a suit to recover
deficiency payments, the district court held for the taxpayer. 2 The
United States appealed.
Held: The accompaniment of an executive's wife merely to serve as
his wife at business engagements and social gatherings may qualify as
a bona fide business purpose under Sections 162 and 212 of the Internal
Revenue Code if properly related to corporate sales and goodwill
promotion.- Affirmed.
I. United States v. Disney, 24 Am. Fed. Tax R,2d 5123, 5124 (9th Cir. 1969).
2. Disney v. United States, 267 F. Supp. I (C D. Cal. 1967).
3. The Ninth Circuit decision directed Disney to include the reimbursements in his gross
income under Section 61(a), and then deduct the amount as a business expense under Section
162(a) No mention was made of Treasury Regulation 1.162-17(b)(l) (1962), stating that:
The employee need not report on his tax return . . . expenses for travel, transportation,
entertainment and similar purposes paid or incurred by him solely for the benefit of his
employer . . for which the employee is paid through. . . reimbursements ...
Although Mrs Disney was not an employee, Treasury Regulation 1.162-17 would arguably apply
to the expenses of Roy Disney, as an employee, for the expenses of his wife. Nevertheless, the
question before the court was whether the reimbursements resulted from ordinary, necessary and
reasonable travehng expenses incurred by the corporation through an employee in the pursuit of
business See lwt REv CODE of 1954, § 162.
The Regulation- provide that travel expenses incurred by a wife accompanying her husband-
employee arc ordinary and necessary within the meaning of Section 162 only if it can be
adequately shown that her presence on the trip had a "bona fide business purpose." Treas. Reg.
§ 1.162-2(c) (1958). See also Treas. Reg § 1.162-2(c) (1958) and Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(b)(2)
(1958)
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The emphasis of the Disney holding is not directed at particular
tasks or services performed by the wife, but at contributions of a
"wifely" nature.' Mrs. Disney attended social gatherings, press
conferences, photography sessions, luncheons and other primarily
social engagements. Much of her time was spent shopping, sight-seeing
or visiting. In short, Mrs. Disney did little more than travel with her
husband as his wife, joining him at social functions related to the
corporation's business. A review of other cases dealing with travel
expenses of wives reveals a significant number of instances in which the
activitives of the wife were similar to those of Mrs. Disney, but in
which no deduction to the corporation, or exemption for
reimbursement was allowed. To explain Disney, they must be
distinguished.
As indicated by the Disney court, the primary focus under section
162 of ihe Code is whether the expenditures are necessary: the wife's
activities must be analyzed in relation to her husband's business
activities. If the husband's responsibilities include substantial and
intimate social contacts, and if it can be adequately demonstrated that
his wife's presence enhances these contacts, her presence is for the
benefit of the business, even though clearly "personal" in character.
Both Disney and its predecessor, Warwick v. United States,7 indicate
that such a relationship is found only under "unusual circumstances."
Even for those executives who appear to qualify the burden of proof
4. United States v. Disney, 24 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5123, 5125 (9th Cir. 1969).
5. Those cases denying the deduction include: United States v. Gotcher, 401 F.2d 118 (5th Cir.
1968); Sheldon v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1962); Silverman v. Commissioner, 253
F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1958); Kloppenburg v. United States, 17 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 507 (S.D. Ill.
1965); William H. Leonhart 68,098; P-H Tax Ct. Mem.; Joy L. Zubrod 67,204; P-H Tax
Ct. Mem.; L.R. Schmaus Co., Inc. 67,197; P-H Tax Ct. Mem.; william H. Johnson T 66,164;
P-H Tax Ct. Mem.; Francis X. Heidi 64,007; P-H Tax Ct. Mem.; Challenge Mfg. Co., 37
T.C. 650 (1962); Alabama-Georgia Syrup Co., 36 T.C. 747 (1961) (Acq.); John A. Guglielmetti,
35 T.C. 668 (1961); William E. Reisner, 34 T.C. 668 (1960); Frederick C. Moser 59,025; P-H
Tax Ct. Mem.; Ralph E. Duncan 30 T.C. 386 (1958); Cornelius Vanderbilt, Jr. 57,235; P-H
Tax Ct. Mem.; L.L. Moorman, 26 T.C. 666 (1956); Axel S. Stokby 53,236; P-H Tax Ct.
Mem.; Walter Schmidt, I t B.T.A. 759 (1925). Cases allowing deductions include: United States
v. Disney, 24 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5123 (9th Cir. 1969); Peoples Life Ins. Co. v. United States,
373 F.2d 924 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Poletti v. Cotnmissioner, 13 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1252 (8th Cir.
1964); Warwick v. United States, 236 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. Va. 1964).
6. "The critical inquiries are whether the dominant purpose of the trip was to serve her
husband's business purpose in making the trip and whether she actually spent a substantial
amount of her time in assisting her husband in fulfilling that purpose." United States v. Disney,
24 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5123, 5127 (9th Cir. 1969).
7. 236 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. Va. 1964).
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may be heavy. The narrow scope of Disney stems from the Code's
presumption against deductions for family expenses,' and from the
several cases indicating that services rendered by a wife on a trip are
generally incidental to the husband's business affairs and are intended
primarily for the convenience of the husband. If the wife serves as a
nurse9 or performs occasional clerical tasks t° such as making
appointments or arranging a business contact," the courts have
uniformly held her duties incidental. In these cases, the wife supplies
no greater assistance "than a wife, with a reasonable interest in her
husband's business affairs, would normally provide. 1' 2 Nor is it
sufficient for the taxpayer merely to show that the company's policy
requires the wife's presence. t.1 All of these cases demonstrate how
closely the courts adhere to a "presumption" of nondeductability,
regardless of how harsh this may be to the taxpayer. 4
To distinguish Disney and its precursor Warwick v. United States,
from these cases, they must be analyzed on their fLcts. In Warwick the
taxpayer, as vice-president and member of the boar'd of directors, acted
in a sales capacity for Universal, a tobacco coml any with customers
throughout the world. He worked to establish goodwill with customers
who placed large orders crucial to the corporation's financial success.
8 It Ris CODM of 1954,§ 262.
9 ',,, Joy L Zubrod t 67,204; P-H Tax Ct. Mem.; William E. Reisner, 34 T.C. 1122 (1960);
George \& Megeath, 5 B.T.A. 1274 (1927). Contra, Allenburg Cotton Co., Inc., 7 Am. Fed. Tax
R.2d 36h VA I) Tenn. 1960).
10 VWillam H Johnson 4 66,164; P-H Tax Ct. Mem.; accord. L.L. Moorman, 26 T.C. 666
(1956)
II \labama-6eorgia Syrup Co., 36 T.C. 747 (1961) (Acq.); Axel S. Stokby 53,236; P-H
Tax(t Mem
12 t rederick C. Moser f 59,025; P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
13 1lo hold othersiise permits the taxpayer-corporation to define for itself the scope of Section
162 \ long-standing company policy is, ho"eser, clearly a factor considered by the courts. See
United states v Disney, 24 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5123, 5127 (9th Cir. 1969); Warwick v. United
States, 236 1 Supp 761 (E.D. Va. 1964); f Commissioner v. Motch, 180 F.2d 859 (6th Cir.
1950)
14 1 he thidi case offers a good illustration of the harshness of the presumption. Heidl was
an international shipping agent whose wife, a qualified but non-practicing bookkeeper,
accompanied him to Europe on business As a major stockholder of her husband's business, her
stock having been bought with her own funds, she had served as an active director since
incorporation, often consulting %%ith her husband, other officers and employees. In addition, she
personally corresponded Aith agents and customers. Nevertheless, the court refused to accept her
presence on the European trip as necessary, apparently influenced in part by her lack of salary,
her attendance on sight-seeing trips and the need to scrutinize closely exclusively family businesses.
Francis X Heidl 64.007; P-H Tax Ct. Mem. But see Price, Traveling With Your Wife May
O 7ang 28 I i-D B J 75 84-85 (1968).
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Many contacts with these clients involved social affairs where wives
were customarily present. 5 As a consequence, Mrs. Warwick assisted
her husband in establishing "the close friendly intimate relationship
with the customers that Universal required of her husband."" At no
time did she plan the itinerary, sit in on negotiations, quote prices or
describe the market, although she stayed near her husband while he
transacted business. She entertained customers and their wives,
occasionally toured factories and did a minor amount of typing for her
husband.
From an objective point of view, Mrs. Warwick's activities appeared
identical to the activities of wives who served as hostesses and
entertained potential customers in other cases which denied favorable
tax treatment.17 The Warwick court distinguished these cases by
examining not only what Mrs. Warwick did, but what she did not do.
She was never a tourist in the usual sense. Her time was not her own
since business required moving from place to place on short notice. Nor
did she accompany her husband to the Far East, since Universal found
a wife's presence there disadvantageous. The court also gave some
weight to the facts that the board of directors -formally approved the
policy of reimbursement for a wife's expenses on European trips, and
to the testimony of the corporation's president that Mrs. Warwick
contributed measurably to the success of her husband and the image
of the company. Finally, the court emphasized that this was neither a
single trip, nor series of trips, but a continuing plan of travel both for
the husband and the wife.' 8
15. In Warwick, the court noted that the number of clients in Europe was decreasing with the
amount of sales per customer increasing as the number of competitors in the foreign market
contracted. In Disney, the court noted that the film industry demanded a special feeling of'
fellowship among showpeople. Both courts interpreted these business facts as demanding an
unusual number of reciprocal social contacts by the corporate representatives.
16. Warwick v. United States, 236 F. Supp. 761,765 (E.D. Va. 1964).
17. See William H. Leonhart 68,098; P-H Tax Ct. Mem.; L.R. Schmaus, Co., Inc.
67,197; P-H Tax Ct. Mem.; cf. Sheldon v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1962); Francis
X. Heidi T 64,007; P-H Tax Ct. Mem.; Alabama-Georgia Syrup Co. 36 T.C. 747 (1961) (Acq.);
John A. Guglielmetti, 35 T.C. 668, 671 (1961); Frederick C. Moser 59,025; P-H Tax Ct. Mem.;
Cornelius Vanderbilt, Jr. 57,235; P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
18. A subsequent case, Peoples Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 373 F.2d 924 (Ct. Cl. 1967),
utilized a method of analysis similar to Warwick in deciding that payment of expenses incurred
at an annual convention by an insurance company's agents and their wives did not constitute
income to the employees. The Peoples court held that the company's policy of bringing the wives
of its agents to its conventions served a valid business purpose. To reach its conclusion, the court
relied on the employer's ample documentation of the important role of the wife in her husband's
and, consequently, the company's success. Before the husband was hired, the wife was interviewed
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1969/iss3/4
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To reach its result in Disne'. the court found that as a high-ranking
executive, Mr. Disney's job required attendance at various meetings,
conferences, conventions and screenings of company products, each
involving substantial social contact. In this regard, Mr. Disney was
expected to "promote the public image of the company as one engaged
in family-type entertainment and to cultivate close and cordial
relationships between his company and the exhibitors and other
executives with whom the company dealt throughout the world." 9 The
court noted that, to a large extent, Mr. Disney was a "celebrity" of
the company.20
In Divne!v and Warwick, the husband-employees were high-ranking
corporate officials, choosing to follow a corporate policy which they
were free to disregard. Both transacted little actual business, such as
drafting contract agreements or closing orders and delivery dates; each
served primarily as a good-will ambassador for the company. They
found from experience that their wives were an asset to them on these
trips. Moreover, the taxpayers participated in a corporate program of
continual traveling instead of infrequent trips. Both were employed in
corporations in which good-will was of special importance. Although
Di.ine' and Warwick emphasized that the courts reached their
conclusions in part from the "unusual position" that these taxpayers
occupied in the business world,21 the decisions suggest that in the future,
corporate executives need not furtively assign to their wives tasks of a
business nature merely to solidify a claimed exemption or deduction,
and brieled on the insurance business. Afterward, training and educational material was
specifically directed to her. At the convention, the wives participated in the meetings. This special
effort on the part of the corporation to integrate the wives into their husband's business
responsilities was considered controlling. As in Disney and Warwick, the Peoples decision grants
legal significance to an acknoledged business tact: a businessman's wife, merely by her presence,
can exert significant influence upon her husband's business dealings. See also Patterson v.
Thomas. 289 I- 2d 108, 114-21 (5th Cir. 1961) (dissent); Kloppenburg v. United States, 17 Am.
Fed lax R 2d 507 (S.D. I11. 1965) (jury allowing deductions reversed on appeal by judgment
notwithstanding the verdict).
19 (Inited States , Disney, 24 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5123, 5126 (9th Cir. 1969).
20 Il-Ixecuties identified with the company are frequently in the public eye . Id. at
5123
21 United States v. Disney, 24 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5123, 5126 (9th Cir. 1969); Warwick v.
United States, 236 F. Supp. 761, 767 (E.D. Va. 1964).
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if the socializing of their wives is both "appropriate""2 and sufficiently
related to their employment responsibilities.
23
22. "The only reason she went was because of her husband's business. Her trip was directly
attributable to her husband's business, and it was appropriate to the conduct of his business. It
assisted him in his business and assisted in the production of his income." Warwick v. United
States, 236 F. Supp. 761, 767 (E.D. Va. 1964).
23. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(d)(4) (1964) which in part provides:
Thus, if a taxpayer and his wife entertain a business customer and the customer's wife
under circumstances where the entertainment of the customer is considered directly related
to the active conduct of the taxpayer's trade or business . . . the portion of the expenditure
allocable to both wives will be considered associated with the active trade or business
For those who suggest that Section 162 of the Code intends, at least in part, to provide economic
equivalency between taxpayers similarly situated, it seems pertinent to analyze why a different
standard is applied by the courts to the taxpayer traveling overnight and to the taxpayer
commuting to the city for an evening at a favorite nightspot.
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